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I. Introduction
There is not yet an authoritative definition for space traffic management.1  A working definition developed by the
International Academy of Astronautics defines the concept as “the set of technical and regulatory provisions for
promoting safe access into outer space, operations in outer space and return from outer space to Earth free
from physical or radio-frequency interference.”2 The essence of space traffic management, therefore, is “to
provide appropriate means for conducting space activities safely and without harmful inference.”3 A challenge to
space traffic management is emerging from a category of space assets commonly referred to by the commercial space
economy as Small Satellites (“SmallSats”). A SmallSat can be deployed and operated singularly or as part of a group
referred to as a constellation or swarms which together operate toward a common goal.4  These space assets are
also referred to by designations other than SmallSats. For instance, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency refers to SmallSats as “LightSats,” the U.S. Naval Space Command calls them SPINSat's (Single Purpose
Inexpensive Satellite Systems), while the U.S. Air Force refers to them as TACSat's (Tactical Satellites).5 
The SmallSat industry now markets build it yourself “satellite kits” for less than $10,000 which price includes the
cost of placing the SmallSat into orbit.6  This circumstance has led to the recognition that the “knowledge of how to
make and use SmallSats has passed the tipping point," and is fostering a global generation of satellite builders and
engineers which can even include a teenager who buys a CubeSat kit and a soldering iron.”7 Passing the “tipping
point” is also  unleashing “the most powerful force in the universe - human creativity.” 8 This aspect of SmallSats
have is viewed as having “democratized” space access by lowering the cost of placing space assets in orbit as well as
opening additional avenues of access to space.9 Despite this democratization, SmallSats have generated reverberation
from some in the space economy who foresee them as creating a hazard in the space environment despite their
benefits if left unsupervised or unregulated by governments.10 It has even led some to view them as being “space
junk” regardless of their benefits and contributions unless they can be removed from orbit upon retirement.11 
SmallSats are becoming a staple of the space economy that present and will continue to present scenarios requiring
the United States and other countries to balance its nationals access to and use of space with  the avoidance of
harmful interference to the space activities of others. This paper will explore State responsibility for space traffic
management associated with certain orbital hazards perceived as being created by the proliferating deployment of
SmallSats.
II.   Back To The Future with SmallSats
Smallsats are not new. Rather they are the contemporary reincarnation of the initial artificial space satellites. Sputnik
1, the first space asset was launched and entered Earth orbit on October 4, 1957. It was a 58.0 cm-diameter
aluminum sphere having a mass of 83.6 kg.12  Sputnik 1 was followed in space by other small artificial satellites.13
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This initial generation of SmallSats eventually ceded space to large satellites. The transition to large satellites not
only made space access expensive but it essentially created a limited portal for space access controlled by a small
cadre of nations consisting principally of the United States, Russia, China, Japan and certain western European
countries.14 Within the last decade non-state actors began developing their own spacecraft,15 launch vehicles,16 and
launch facilities.17 The escalation of space activity by non state actors has lessened the dependence on States for
access to outer space and future develop of space commerce. This opening of the space access portal has led to the 
recent re-emergence of SmallSats. 
SmallSats are a generic category which generally refer to satellites having a mass of less than 500 kg.18
This encompasses a range of space assets designated as Mini Satellites (“Minisats”), Micro Satellites (“Microsats”),
Nano Satellites (“Nanosats”) , Pico Satellites  (“Picosats”), Femto Satellites (“Femtosats”) 19 and Spires.20  Although
the definitions for these varying sub-categories of SmallSats are arbitrary, they are generally differentiated on the
basis of mass.21  This mass determination is based on the SmallSat’s in-orbit fully fueled mass.22 Minisats are
smallsats having a mass between 100 and 500 kg.23 Microsats have a mass between 10 and 100 kg.24 Nanosats have a
mass of 1 to 10 kg.25 Picosats possess a mass of 10g to 1 kg while the mass of Femtosats is less than 10 g.26  Spires
are about the size of a postage stamp and they contain all the essentials for a satellite such as a radio, aerials a solar
cell and instruments.27 It is estimated that about 100 Spires can fit inside a CubeSatellite. 28  While Cube Satellites
(“CubeSats”) come within the SmallSat classification, they are not truly a distinct sub-category as their name derives
from their design  and not their mass. Cubesats normally fall within the nanosat or picosat classification.29 The
cubesat design, however, is the standard most utlized by smallsats.30 A newer design known as a Tube Satellite
(“TubeSat”) is emerging to compete with the CubeSat design.31 A TubeSat is a low cost alternative to a CubeSat
which has a maximum mass of 0.75 kg.32 
SmallSats are mostly used for terrestrial and extra-terrestrial observation and data collection purposes as well as for
testing of new technologies.33  This has resulted in their being used by “super secret agencies,” militaries, and
national space agencies of space faring nations, but also by governments of non-traditional space faring countries and
non-State entities such as academia and juridical persons which had previously lacked the economic and
technological means to access space.34 The access and human creativity is leading some to envision SmallSats as
eventually following the trend of  personal ownership of technological devices such as radios, televisions, computers
and mobile phones with individuals having their own personal SmallSat35 which will consist of a SmallSat or a
constellation of SmallSats with their own “IP addresses controlled through the Internet and providing individualized
positioning, communications, social and multimedia capability."36 Some even view SmallSats as being the
appropriate mechanism for space burials and other personal social and commercial activities.37 Such visions raises
space traffic management concerns as they can lead to a proliferation of SmallSats in Earth orbit.  
Prior to discussing a few of the space traffic management problems associated with a proliferation of SmallSats, it
will be beneficial to understand the concept of State responsibility and how it differs from international liability
within the context of the space law regime. 
III.  The Intersection of State Responsibility and Space Traffic Management
State responsibility “embraces all aspects of obligations incumbent upon States vis-'a-vis other States, whether
voluntarily contracted or imposed by custom.”38 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (“Outer Space Treaty”)39  is the
cornerstone of the international space legal framework. Article VI of the treaty imposes State responsibility for all
national activities in outer space and for “assuring” that all national activities in outer space conform with the treaty
provisions. Article VI, therefore, imposes responsibility on a State for space traffic management involving the space
activities of its nationals. The scope of Article VI’s State responsibility for space traffic management is best seen by
contrast with international liability established by Outer Space Treaty Article VII and its prodigy the Convention on
International Liability for Damages Caused By Space Objects (“Liability Convention”).40
Article VII extends international liability for States that launch and procures the launch of an object into outer space.
The Liability Convention provides guidance on the application and scope of the international liability imposed by
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Outer Space Treaty Article VII. The Liability Convention limits liability to a launching state(s) for third party
damage caused by its “space object.” Article 1(a) defines “damage” to mean “loss of life, personal injury or other
impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of
international intergovernmental organizations. Pursuant to Article 1( c) a “launching State” is a State which launches
or procures the launch of the space object and the State from whose territory or facility the space object is launched.
There can be more than one launching State for a space object. The term “space object” has a redundant definition.
Liability Convention defines Article 1(d) reads as follows “[t]he term ‘space object’ includes component parts of a
space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.” 
Articles II through VII allocate fault and set the criteria for applying absolute or strict liability, shared liability,
apportioned liability and exoneration of liability. The loci of the damage occurrence determines which liability
scheme applies. For instance, if a space weather event causes a space object to crash to Earth, each launching state
will have absolute liability for all damage it causes on the Earth’s surface.41 Exoneration from absolute liability can
occur if a launching State proves that the damage resulted either, wholly or partially, from gross negligence or an
intention act or omission by the claimant State or natural or juridical persons on whose behalf it has brought the
claim.42 However, such exoneration is not available if the activities of a launching State were not in conformity with
international law or the space law treaty regime.43
Absolute liability for each launching State will also exist for any and all damage and injury the space object causes to
an airline in flight or people or property aboard the airplane.44  However, it is unclear if this absolute liability applies
if the space object damages a space transport craft while it is transiting the atmosphere heading into outer space. It
seems this will depend upon whether such a craft is deemed to be an airplane prior to crossing the boundary into
outer space. Nevertheless, this absolute liability is subject to the same exoneration principles as those applicable to
damage a space object causes on Earth.
The measure of recovery for damage is “determined in accordance with international law and the principles of justice
and equity, in order to provide such reparation in respect of the damage as will restore the person, natural or
juridical, State or international organization on whose behalf the claim is presented to the condition which would
have existed if the damage had not occurred.” There is not any financial limitation on the amount of recovery.
However, it is unclear  whether the recovery is limited to direct damages or whether it can include indirect
damages.45  
While international liability under Outer Space Treaty Article VII is limited in its scope and application, that is not
the circumstance with respect to State responsibility imposed by Outer Space Treaty Article VI.  Traditionally, State
responsibility represents the classic concept for dealing with a state’s violation of customary international law which
causes injuries to another state or to nationals of another State.46 A State suffers a distinct and separate injury when
one of its nationals is injured by another state.47 To this extent, the act does not have to be committed directly by a
State as it is sufficient if the act or conduct can be attributable to the State.48 A breach can be attributable to a State if
the State plays an active role in causing the injury,49 omits to perform an act50, or having knowledge of a hazardous
condition fails to warn others of the hazard.51 When a breach of international law attributable to a State inflicts injury
on nationals of another State, the duty is to make reparations.52 Reparations are a mandatory duty which attaches to a
State violating an international obligation.53   The remedy is generally owned only to another State as individuals and
other non-state entities traditionally lack standing under international law to pursue or collect reparations under State
responsibility jurisprudence.54 Reparations are meant to restore the injured party to the condition that existed prior to
the breach of the international obligation.55 If that is not possible, then a monetary payment corresponding to the
value of the restitution is appropriate. If neither of these are totally sufficient, then reparations can take the form of
an apology,56official recognition of the injury,57 or promises or guarantees of nonrepetition of the injurious act or
conduct.58 
Article VI’s  State responsibility obligation is much broader in scope and application than international liability
assessed pursuant to Outer Space Treaty Article VII and the Liability Convention. First, State responsibility is not
limited to launching States. It extends to any State with “national activities in outer space.” The exact breath of this
coverage is uncertain in as much as “activities in outer space” is an undefined term. The lack of a definition creates
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uncertainty on scope in as much as it is unresolved if the phrase “national activities in outer space” is restricted to
acts performed in space or if it includes activities in space remotely controlled by a person on Earth. The lack of a
restrictive definition suggests that  Article VI’s responsibility encompasses “all the concomitant activities associated
with what actually occurs in outer space, both before and after.”59 Moreover, even a narrow reading of Article VI can
reasonably lead to the conclusion that the supervising responsibility includes “terrestrial activities directly related to
concurrent activities in outer space.”60 This suggests that State responsibility for national activities in space not only
applies to conduct which actually takes place in space, but also includes conduct on Earth which is integrally related
to acts or events which transpire in space. Additionally, Article VI imposes responsibility to supervise “space
activities” on the appropriate State. As with the term “national activities in outer space” the Outer Space Treaty does
not define or explain how to determine what is an “appropriate State.”61 
Another divergence between State responsibility and international liability in space law is that the Liability
Convention limits recovery to damage as defined in Article 1(a). Outer Space Treaty Article VI does not impose any
such limitation. This means reparations for breach of Article VI can encompass economic harm and injury excluded
by the Liability Convention.62 Moreover, the Liability Convention limits recovery to third party damage claims
arising from a space asset colliding with other space objects in space or an airplane in flight or anything on Earth.63
Recovery for breach of State responsibility obligation is not limited to such third party claims.64  A further 
distinction between the Liability Convention and Outer Space Treaty Article VI is that the Liability Convention
imposes a one year limitations period for initiating a claim for damage.65 Article VI does not contain any limitation
period. 
Lastly, while the Liability Convention limits its remedy to the payment of compensation, State responsibility under
Outer Space Treaty Article VI includes non compensatory remedies.66 Even more so, State responsibility
incorporates an obligation of “due diligence”which requires a State to take prophylactic measures to prevent harm or
injury to another State or its nationals67 or a part of the global commons68 which includes outer space.69 This due
diligence obligation is not limited to State action, but it also extends to taking preventive measures in connection
with the conduct of a State’s nationals.70  A breach of the  due diligence standard gives rise to State responsibility
and the reparations requirement.71 Whether a State has exercised due diligence is a flexible standard which varies
depending upon the particular facts and circumstances72 taking into consideration a few objective factors.73 The
objective criteria consists of 1) the degree of foreseeability or predictability of the harm, 2) the importance of the
interest needing protection,74 and 3) the State’s capability.75 Thus, due diligence is a sliding scale adjusted according
to a State’s ability and resources.76 This spectrum suggests that the United States, as a major traditional space faring
country, bears greater obligation for space traffic management of SmallSats than other less capable countries.
Outer Space Treaty Article VI imposes international responsibility on a State for the space conduct of its nationals
and for “assuring” that national activities in outer space are carried out in conformity with all provisions of the Outer
Space Treaty. This supervisory responsibility includes a State assuring that its nationals space activities comply  with
Outer Space Treaty Article IX which requires conducting all space activities with due regard to the corresponding
interests of all other States. Thus, State responsibility rather than international liability is more attuned to space
traffic management as it concerns supervising conduct whereas international liability only concerns who pays for
damage.77 
 
IV.  Collisions, Weather and Maneuverability:  SmallSat Concerns In Space Traffic Management
A.  Collisions In Space  
Currently, SmallSats are normally placed in low earth orbit (“LEO”), 78 which is an orbit less than 1,240 miles above
the Earth and is the orbit used by larger space objects such as the International Space Station (“ISS”), government
communication satellites and earth observation satellites.79  LEO is an orbit particularly known for being at high risk
for collisions between space objects80 as well as being overly saturated with artificial space debris.81 A looming issue
with respect to the proliferation of SmallSats is the potential for their colliding with a space object. The collision
concern posed by SmallSats in LEO is evident by how the International Space Station deploys SmallSats. Being
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cognizant of the collision risk, when ISS personnel deploy SmallSats, the SmallSats are  deliberately deployed in a
LEO lower than that occupied by the ISS “to avoid the risk of ‘recontact’ with the station.”82 While there is
disagreement over whether the Liability Convention applies to a collision involving a SmallSat,83 there can not be
any dispute that such an incident can trigger State responsibility under Outer Space Treaty Article VI intertwined
with space traffic management concerns caused by the creation of additional space debris. 
The ISS deploys SmallSats in an orbit lower than its own because the two most important characteristics of
SmallSats are “the comparatively less precise orbital fidelity and more limited orientation control and pointing
precision.”84 The lack of orbital fidelity and maneuverability is the product of SmallSats not possessing any
propulsion system.85  Unlike their Sputnik ancestor, SmallSats are generally launched as secondary payloads on
rockets carrying larger space objects.86 In being secondary payloads, SmallSats are generally placed in the orbit of
the primary payloads which they accompany into space.87  Thus, the growing use of SmallSats to access space only
increases the potential for collisions and resulting pollution of LEO with space debris.88 In a presentation at the 65th
International Astronautical Congress in Toronto, Canada, Dr. Hugh Lewis, a space debris expert, stated that since
2005 SmallSats have been involved in more than 360,000 close approaches of less than 5kg with other orbiting
objects.89 Extrapolating this data over the next 30 years, Dr. Lewis estimates there will be over one million close
approaches involving SmallSats during the next three decades “with a handful leading to a collision.”90  The greatest
risk of collisions involve SmallSats orbiting at an altitude of 750 kg or above as SmallSats at that altitude have a
longer orbital lifespan.91
To alleviate LEO congestion, it is suggested that SmallSats be deployed in a higher orbit. A higher orbit only
transfers the congestion problem from LEO to another orbital plane.  A higher orbit means that at the end of life, the
SmallSat will be subject to much less atmospheric drag, if any at all, which will result in the SmallSat becoming
space debris as opposed to being consumed by the Earth’s atmosphere during a fall from LEO.92 Moreover, higher
orbits will more directly expose SmallSats to space weather anomalies.   
B. Weather
 “Space weather” is defined as the “conditions on the Sun and in the solar wind, magnetosphere, ionosphere, and
thermosphere that can influence the performance and reliability of space-borne and ground-based technological
systems and that can affect human life and health.”93 It encompasses solar events such as solar wind, coronal mass
ejections (CMEs)and solar flares94 which cause space weather phenomena hazardous to space objects such as
electrostatic discharge by space objects and  geomagnetic storms,95 and increased radiation exposure.96 However, the
Earth’s magnetic field and atmosphere shields satellites in LEO from most but not all of the adverse effects of solar
weather events and cosmic radiation. This natural protection and the short lifespan of SmallSats in LEO together
with the drive to maintain low cost for SmallSats, mean SmallSats lack the shielding and protection from space
weather as other space assets.97  Indeed, in designing satellites for space, engineers seek to strike a reasonable
balance between sufficient design against the natural space environment factors and designs viewed as immensely
expensive and counterproductive.98 SmallSats are not an exception to this economic balancing consideration.99
Given SmallSats limited lifespan of a few weeks to a few years depending on the altitude in LEO, space weather
events are not viewed as a significant factor. It is assumed that  the SmallSats will not be in orbit for a sufficient
amount of time for the natural space environment to degrade its systems or operation. Whatever the merits of this
perspective, it conveniently disregards the occurrence of a single upset event which can impair a satellite’s function. 
A single event upset normally corresponds with a Solar Proton Event (“SPE”).100 A SPE occurs when protons are
accelerated to very high energies by a solar flare accompanied by a CME which electrically charges a space object
and generates electrostatic discharge better known as ESD.101  Although an ESD is a random occurrence in the space
environment,102 it is the most prevalent hazard to space assets.103 An ESD occurs when energetic electrons penetrate a
spacecraft’s external surface or  skin and builds up a charge in the internal circuitry.104 “If the charge builds up faster
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than its dissipation, this breaks down the shielding and produces an electrostatic discharge.”105 An ESD can
temporarily or permanently disrupt electronic components or even cause the launching of a “phantom command”
which results in  a space object  engaging in uncontrolled functions.106 An ESD is said to have caused the total loss of
a Telstar 401 satellite in January 1997.107 More recently, an ESD is said to have crippled or transformed an Intelsat
Galaxy 15 satellite into a “zombie” for an eight month period between April 2010 and December 2010.108 During
this”zombie” stage, the  Intelsat Galaxy 15  was unresponsive to command controls and drifted from its GEO but
continued to transmit its broadcast transmissions.109 Although it is said there was never a threat of the satellite
colliding with another space object, the satellite operator did take measures to minimize the satellite’s broadcasting
transmission signals from interfering with other satellites.110 
The Intelsat Galaxy 15 and Telstar 401 are large satellites that suffered adverse consequences due to an ESD.
SmallSats in LEO are most susceptible to a single upset event or an ESD when their orbit passes through the aural
zone.111  Given that SmallSats are not engineered or constructed to confront space weather events, it is reasonable to
conclude that SmallSats will not readily survive an ESD experience. Likewise, deploying SmallSats in higher orbits
remove them from the natural protection afforded by the magnetosphere and atmosphere meaning they will be even
more susceptible to space weather events thereby increasing the opportunity of their being converted into an
inoperable asset or debris. 
  
 
C.  Maneuverability 
The lack of fidelity to a particular orbit and maneuverability gives rise to the concept of adding miniature propulsion
systems or thrusters to SmallSats.112 Generally, launch operators disfavor secondary payloads like SmallSats from
carrying hazardous fuel or propellants.113 Moreover, heritage space propulsion systems tend to be too cumbersome
and bulky for SmallSats.114 Now that SmallSats are becoming a staple of the space economy, engineers have the
reason and motivation to design “tiny spaceship engines using safer fuel.”115  Engineering SmallSats with propulsion
systems or thrusters will give them maneuverability which will assist in their adhering to a precise orbit and in end of
life debris mitigation for those in orbits above 600 kg.116 It will also allow them to be serve as “garbage collectors”
by using them to “pull larger retired satellites down to a lower orbit and eventual degradation in the Earth’s
atmosphere.117 While such maneuverability increases the beneficial functions of SmallSats, it also opens the door to a
more hideous peril of an adverse seizure of command and control better known as hijacking.
“Hijacking” of a space object is a silent but valid concern.118 The fear is that a rogue space object can threaten or
produce a debris field by causing a collision with another space object.119  In addition to the property and economic
loss of the involved objects, such an incident could produce enough debris to create a cascading effect which can
exponentially magnify the potential of future collisions between artificial debris and other space objects.120  Such a
exponential risk of collisions already exists in LEO due to China’s destroying one of its own satellites in 2007 and
the collision between Cosmos 2251 and Iriduium 33 in 2009.121   The  ‘hijacking” of a satellite is not fanciful science
fiction as in 2007 and 2008 it is reported that command and control of different U.S. satellites were the subject of an
unauthorized seizure.122 According to the reports, in October 2007 unauthorized persons “gained access to a NASA
Landsat- 7 satellite for about 12 minutes and for another 12 minutes in July 2008.123 Then in June 2008 “a TerraAM-
1 satellite was accessed for two minutes” and was again accessed for nine minutes in October 2008. It is said that
“the hijackers of the Terra AM-1 satellite, ‘achieved all the steps required to command the satellite,’” but the
hijackers did not do so.124  Although it is believed the seizures were the work of a foreign governmental entity,125 the
incidents establish that hijacking of a satellite or space object is a reality. More importantly though, is that if it
command and control of United States governmental satellites is possible, then it seems seizing command and
control of a SmallSat can be achieved by governmental and non-governmental entities. This is even more so since
SmallSats do not have the command and control codes associated with large satellites. 
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IV. State Policing of SmallSats
Outer Space Treaty Article VI delegates to States the responsibility of policing the space activities of its nationals.126
This obligation is normally viewed a State instituting the appropriate licensing schemes.127  For instance, the United
States has instituted a licensing scheme for SmallSats to use any part of the radio frequency 128as well as a licensing
scheme for SmallSats that have the capability to conduct remote sensing of the Earth.129  These licensing schemes,
however, apply to all satellites as the remote licensing requirement has a national security justification130 while the
frequency regulation stems from the governmental control of the radio frequencies of the electromagnetic
spectrum.131 Accordingly, in the United States, if a SmallSat will not use a radio frequency or have remote sensing
capability, then “[a]nyone can put a small satellite into orbit if they can figure out how to engineer it and pay for the
ride.”132 Similar to the United States, the international community essentially relies on the rules applicable to
satellites in general to govern the use and activities of SmallSats. Basic economics suggest that this approach is not
sustainable in the long term. For instance, the low acquisition cost, low launch cost and short lifespan of most
SmallSats effectively make them a disposable space asset which is readily replaceable. This materially separates
SmallSats from large satellites given the vast difference in cost and replacement logistics.  This distinction will
eventually necessitate the implementation of some rudimentary control standard for SmallSats. 
At this juncture, specialized regulation of SmallSats will essentially be premised on concerns projected over the
horizon as there is not a consensus that SmallSats constitute a harmful interference with space activities.
Nevertheless, such future regulatory standards can entail a SmallSat owner being required to justify the need for
placing a SmallSat in orbit. For instance, drones and weather balloons can be used for some of the same purposes as
SmallSats.133 It would seem that deploying a SmallSat may be discouraged, if not prohibited, when a drone or
balloon could readily provide the same service. Discouragement can take the form of a government assessment for
using a SmallSat when a drone or balloon will suffice. Alternatively, the government may implement a security
screening protocol for those desiring to place a SmallSat in Earth orbit. While such a “tipping” point has not yet been
reached, it will probably arrive in the near future especially if SmallSats are subsequently classified or viewed as a
national security concern.  
In the interim, regulatory measures may be necessary to ensure that SmallSats have a viable retirement program, use
sufficient shielding to better withstand space weather effects such as ESD, have a certain level of maneuverability
and have protocols in place to address the loss of command and control of the SmallSat whether the loss is
attributable to the natural space environment or human intervention.
      
V.  Conclusion
SmallSats allow easy and low cost access to and use of outer space. This has caused a steady growth in SmallSat
deployment which will only escalate in the foreseeable and extended future. However, the benefits of this space
access have to be “balanced with the greater risk of debris creation associated” with the use of SmallSats.134 The
balance has be reached through national regulation135 until such time as a fortuitous event motivates the international
community to  agree on protocols addressing concerns particular to SmallSats.
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